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ABSTRACT 
Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game* 
by Dietmar Fehr, Dorothea Kübler, and David Danz 
We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a 
baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure, feedback 
about choices in the previous period and random matching, we run treatments 
(i) with fixed matching, (ii) without information about the opponent’s payoffs, and 
(iii) without feedback about previous play. Using Stahl and Wilson’s (1995) 
model of limited strategic reasoning, we classify behavior with regard to its 
strategic sophistication and consider its development over time. In the 
treatments with feedback and full information about the game, we observe more 
strategic play, more best-responses to beliefs and more accurate beliefs over 
time. While feedback is the main driving force of learning to play strategically 
and for forming beliefs that accurately predict the behavior of the opponent, 
both incomplete information about the opponent’s payoffs or lack of feedback 
lead to a stagnation of best-response rates over time. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Information und Erwartungen in einem wiederholten Normalformspiel 
Wir untersuchen die Entwicklung von den Erwartungen über das Verhalten des 
anderen Spielers und den Entscheidungen in einem wiederholten 
Normalformspiel. Zusätzlich zum Haupttreatment mit common knowledge über 
das Spiel, Feedback über das Ergebnis in der vorigen Runde und zufälliger 
Zuordnung der Spieler, gibt es Kontrolltreatments mit (i) festen paarweisen 
Zuordnungen der Spieler, (ii) ohne Information über die Auszahlungen des 
anderen Spielers und (iii) ohne Feedback über das Ergebnis der vorigen Runde. 
Mit Hilfe von Stahl und Wilsons (1995) Modell begrenzten strategischen 
Verhaltens klassifizieren wir das Verhalten der Teilnehmer im Hinblick auf die 
strategische Sophistikation. In den Treatments mit Feedback und vollständiger 
Information über das Spiel nehmen strategisches Verhalten, beste Antworten 
auf die eigenen Erwartungen und die Akkuratheit der Erwartungen über die Zeit 
zu. Während Feedback der Hauptgrund dafür ist, dass die Teilnehmer lernen, 
sich strategisch zu verhalten und korrekte Erwartungen über das Verhalten des 
anderen Spielers zu bilden, führen sowohl unvollständige Information über die 
Auszahlungen des Gegenspielers als auch fehlendes Feedback zu einer 
Stagnation der Rate der besten Antworten über die Zeit. 
1 Introduction
The literature on learning has opened the black box of how an equilibrium is reached. Numerous
theoretical and experimental papers have studied learning over a large number of periods and
have focused either on the convergence properties of the learning algorithms or on the evolution
of observed behavior in experimental data. Most learning models are backward looking and model
decisions using past observations. More sophisticated learning models posit a deductive reasoning
process implying that players analyze the game in order to understand its strategic properties and
thereby form beliefs about the opponents choice. In this paper we take a microscopic view of
the learning process in order to disentangle its inductive and deductive elements. By varying the
information conditions, we control for the impact of experience and sophistication. Thus, we provide
a unied framework to study deductive learning in a no-feedback environment and experience-based
inductive learning in an environment where relevant information for forward-looking learning is
lacking.
For the experiment, we use a normal-form game with a unique Nash equilibrium that is
Pareto-dominated. Beliefs are measured using an incentive compatible elicitation procedure. Thus,
we complement the decisions with subjectselicited beliefs and observe the joint development of
beliefs and decisions over time. The game we chose allows for a clear-cut distinction between
strategies with higher and lower levels of strategic thinking in the sense of Stahl and Wilsons
level-k model (1995). Using this classication of strategies, we can track the change in the level
of strategic choices of players over time. In the game we use, the Nash equilibrium is Pareto-
dominated by another outcome. Therefore, the game allows for a di¤erentiation between strategic
types with purely self-interested preferences and strategic types with other-regarding preferences,
and it requires players to form beliefs about other playerstypes.
First, we run a baseline treatment with full information about the game and with feedback
about ones own payo¤ (and thereby the others payo¤ and action) in the previous period. In this
treatment, we use a random matching protocol. To check whether the observed learning patterns
are robust to changes in the matching procedure, we employ a treatment with xed pairs for
the whole experiment of 20 periods. These two treatments with full information about the game
and past outcomes serve as our main treatments. To be able to separate between the di¤erent
forms of learning, we employ two additional control treatments. To account for the possibility of
sophistication without feedback (see e.g. Weber 2003), we use a treatment in which subjects receive
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no feedback about the current play.1 In the second control treatment, subjects know only their own
payo¤ function and receive feedback about previous play, but they do not know the payo¤ function
of the other player.2 Studying learning in a normal-form game under both information conditions
allows us to compare their relative importance for learning. Note that sophisticated learners use the
information about the other players payo¤s which is not used by purely experience-based learners
while the experienced-based learners make use of feedback information.
We nd an initially high level of non-strategic behavior in all treatments as subjects tend
to neglect the incentives of their opponents. In the three treatments with feedback about the other
players past behavior, this non-strategic behavior decreases over time and Nash play increases. In
the treatment without feedback about past outcomes, there is virtually no change in behavior over
time. Thus, our results indicate the importance of feedback. Information about the other players
payo¤s matters much less in that it is important for initial play, but much less than expected
from rational players. Thus, subjects seem to have only a limited understanding of the strategic
properties of the game initially, even when they have full information about the game. Also, the
development of choices over time is very similar in treatments with and without information about
the opponents payo¤ function.
Regarding the beliefs, we rst conrm that stated beliefs are better predictors of the actual
choices than the estimated beliefs using belief-learning models. Therefore, we work with the stated
beliefs in all subsequent analyses. Both in standard Nash equilibrium and in the level-k model,
players are assumed to best respond to their beliefs. However, best-response rates are initially only
between 50% and 60% in all treatments. We observe an increase in best responses over time in the
two treatments with full information about the game and about past outcomes, but not in the two
control treatments. Thus, information about past play of the opponent and about his incentives in
the game allow subjects to learn to best respond. As both the Nash equilibrium concept and the
level-k model do not allow for such failures to best respond, this form of learning is not captured
by them.
1 It is conceivable that experience and observation of past play could reduce the need of sophistication. In a
feedback-free environment subjects are presumably more forced to think about the game and therefore they may
acquire simple solution concepts such as iterated dominance or backwards induction. Weber and Rick (2008) demon-
strate that subjects are able to acquire and to transfer such concepts to similar games, but only in feedback-free
environments.
2Oechssler and Schipper (2006) used a similar setup to study subjectsability to learn about the game they are
playing.
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In the framework of the level-k model, players may hold inaccurate beliefs because some
types assume that they are more sophisticated than other players. But players may in fact become
more sophisticated and increase the number of steps of reasoning in the course of the experiment
such that they form more accurate beliefs later on. Thus, the belief data provide evidence on
the level of reasoning of the subjects. Again, we nd that information about the opponents past
choices is necessary for improving the accuracy of belief statements over time.
There are a few recent papers using a belief elicitation procedure in nitely repeated normal-
form games. Nyarko and Schotter (2002) investigated the explanatory power of beliefs inferred from
belief-learning models such as ctitious play models. They used a 2x2 game with a unique mixed-
strategy equilibrium and found that belief learning models cannot predict stated beliefs well. The
two closest papers to our design are Ehrblatt, Hyndman, Özbay and Schotter (2008) and Terracol
and Vaksmann (2009). The rst paper focuses on strategic teaching and its underlying mechanisms
using two normal-form games with a unique Nash equilibrium that is Pareto e¢ cient. The authors
demonstrate that the convergence process largely depends on the presence of a sophisticated subject,
the teacher, and a fast enough follower. Terracol and Vaksman (2009) also investigate learning and
teaching, but in a game with multiple non-Pareto rankable equilibria. They nd evidence for
self-interested teaching, but the multiplicity of equilibria creates a conict between the players,
resulting in a slower convergence process. All three studies have in common that they do not focus
on the relative importance of deductive and inductive learning for the evolution of strategic play in
a game. Although Ehrblatt et al. (2008) also ran a treatment with incomplete information about
the opponents payo¤s, none of the papers employs a treatment without feedback. Furthermore,
the Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in our game allows for a di¤erentiation of strategic types
with respect to their social preferences, making the belief formation task more demanding.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the design and procedures of
the experiment and provides a description of the level-k model applied to the normal-form game we
used. In Section 3, we present the results, focusing rst on choices and then on belief statements.
Section 4 concludes.
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Left Center Right
Top 78, 68 72, 23 12, 20
Middle 67, 52 59, 63 78, 49
Bottom 21, 11 62, 89 89, 78
Table 1: Game.
2 Experimental design
2.1 The game
In all treatments of the experiment, we used the asymmetric normal-form game presented in Table
1. The game has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which the row player chooses Top
and the column player chooses Left. This equilibrium can be found by applying iterative elimination
of dominated strategies. Note that the Nash equilibrium of the stage game is not Pareto e¢ cient.
The strategy combination of Bottom and Right leads to higher payo¤s for both players. This
outcome maximizes the payo¤ of the player that is least well o¤, and it also maximizes the sum
of payo¤s. As we are interested in the relationship between beliefs and choices, we chose a game
where beliefs about the other players preferences can a¤ect behavior.
The unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game is also the unique subgame perfect equi-
librium of the repeated game. However, there exist Nash equilibria of the nitely repeated game
with xed matching in which the players choose the Pareto-e¢ cient strategy combination (Bottom,
Right) for a number of periods and then switch to the Nash Equilibrium (Top, Left).3 Finally, note
that for the column player choosing Right is strictly dominated by Center.
2.2 Strategies
Stahl and Wilson (1995) proposed a theory of boundedly rational types, based on a hierarchical
model by Nagel (1993). Stahl and Wilson assume that players di¤er in their level of strategic
sophistication. Their model classies players into types according to their level of reasoning. A
level-0 type randomizes uniformly over his strategy space, whereas a level-k type best responds to
level-(k   1) behavior for k 2 f1; 2; ::;1g. Hence the term level-k model.4
3 In case a player deviates in this equilibrium, she is minmaxed by the other player choosing Middle or Center,
respectively, for the rest of the game.
4The level-k model is a useful approach to track o¤-equilibrium behavior. It has been tested and extended by
various other studies mainly in the context of normal-form games (e.g. Costa-Gomes et al 2001; Costa-Gomes and
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Row player Column player
Top L2+/Nash Left L3+/Nash
Middle L1 Center L1/L2
Bottom Utilitarian Right Utilitarian
Table 2: Decision rules.
The level-k model is a static model, but in our repeated setting learning becomes possible.
Within the level-k model, learning can be understood as subjects choosing higher-level strategies.
Suppose a subject starts out by playing the L1 action, but then learns to best respond to L1 by
playing L2 and so forth. Thus, a subject can learn by updating his beliefs in the course of the
game, and we will investigate this on the basis of our data. In particular, we will test whether the
subjects choose higher-level strategies and whether beliefs become more accurate in predicting the
opponentsbehavior over time.
The main focus of this study is on the development of strategic and non-strategic behavior
over time. Thus we use the level-k model to classify the available strategies in our game (see Table
2) and distinguish between strategic and non-strategic types. Strategic types form beliefs based
on an analysis of what others do and best respond to these beliefs, whereas non-strategic types do
not take into account the incentives of others. Given this denition, a strategic, self-interested row
player would choose Top (L2+) and a strategic column player Left (L3+) or Center (L2). It also
emerges from Table 2 that two and three steps of thinking, respectively, are su¢ cient to reach the
unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
As the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto e¢ cient, we can distinguish between Nash play and
play of the most e¢ cient and/or fair outcome. In our game, it is possible that subjects play
higher-level strategies in order to maximize joint payo¤s. This behavior cannot be identied in
games where the Nash equilibrium is on the Pareto frontier. Thus, we also introduce a joint-payo¤
maximizing (or Utilitarian) decision rule, which maximizes the sum of the payo¤s of both players,
given that the other player has the same objective and chooses accordingly.5 According to the
Weizsäcker 2008; Rey Biel forthcoming; Ivanov 2006; or Camerer et al 2004). It is also successful in organizing data
from other games such as auctions, as recently shown by Crawford and Iriberri (2007a, 2007b) as well as Gneezy
(2005). The most common types found in normal-form games are level-1 (L1), level-2 (L2) and Nash types, but their
distribution crucially depends on the set of games investigated.
5Previous studies did not explicitly explore Utilitarian choices, but some of them found behavior pointing in this
direction (e.g. Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008).
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proposed denition of strategic behavior, the joint-payo¤ maximizing action is strategic because
it requires the belief that the other player has the same preferences and acts accordingly. Hence,
under the assumption of other-regarding preferences, the strategies Middle and Center correspond
to L1 whereas all higher-level strategies coincide with Bottom and Right.
The game chosen allows us to identify strategic and non-strategic behavior as clearly as
possible, while we can also distinguish the players with respect to their preferences. For the sake of
a simple classication of the actions in Table 2 in terms of their strategic sophistication, we proceed
as follows. Since the actions Middle and Center represent best responses to random behavior of
the other player, we call it » L1«. Note that for a self-interested column player the strategy Center
can also be due to L2 behavior. Similarly, the actions Top and Left are called » Nash« because
they comprise all strategies that reect higher levels than L1 for the row player as well as higher
levels than L2 for the column player, including Nash play, under the assumption of self-interested
preferences. As we are interested in learning as the amount of switching from the set of low-level
to higher-level strategies, this rough classication is su¢ cient. Likewise, for a clear distinction
between the considered preference types, we name the actions Bottom and Right » Utilitarian«,
since they are consistent with all levels of reasoning higher than L1 (including Nash) under the
assumption of utilitarian preferences. Therefore, when we describe some event as » an increase in
Nash play«, we mean that we observe an increase in actions that are consistent with higher-level
strategies, given self-interested preferences. Accordingly, a » decrease in L1« denotes a reduction
of low-level strategic play, no matter which preferences are considered.
2.3 Treatments
To study the impact of information on choices and belief statements, we implemented four treat-
ments, the details of which are given in Table 3. Our main interest is in the random-matching
treatment, denoted by RM. In this treatment subjects had all relevant information about the game,
i.e. the set of players, the set of strategies and the payo¤ function of each player. In addition, after
each period they received feedback about the payo¤ earned in this period (and thereby about the
action of the other player). In all treatments subjects did not receive any feedback about their
payo¤s from the belief elicitation task.6 In the second treatment, we only changed the matching
6Nevertheless, they could infer their payo¤ from this task after receiving feedback about the outcome of the game.
The main reason for not showing the payo¤s from the belief elicitation task was to change as few parameters as
possible when going from RM, PI and FM to NF.
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Treatment Payo¤ Feedback Matching Periods Sessions # of subjects
RM own+opponent own payo¤ random 20 4 54
FM own+opponent own payo¤ xed 20 4 54
PI own own payo¤ xed 20 4 48
NF own+opponent none xed 20 4 50
Table 3: Treatments.
scheme to xed matching, denoted by FM, in order to understand the role of the matching protocol
for learning.
The two remaining treatments serve to control for the e¤ect of information on the learning
process. In treatment NF (no feedback), subjects received no feedback at all, but had common
knowledge of the payo¤ structure of the game as in the baseline treatment. In treatment PI (partial
information), subjects were only informed about their own payo¤ function, but not about the payo¤
function of their opponent. However, they received feedback after each period, such that they could
infer the choice of their opponent.7
We conducted both treatments NF and PI with xed matching. In treatment NF without
any feedback about the behavior of the other player, the matching protocol does not matter for the
game-theoretic prediction. We therefore compare the results from treatment NF to the baseline
treatment with random matching. In treatment PI where we are interested in how players learn to
play a game about which they only hold incomplete information, we employed xed matching to
keep the environment as simple as possible. Accordingly, we compare the results of PI to treatment
FM. Note that repeated-game e¤ects are in principle only possible in treatment FM, but not in
RM, NF and PI. Without feedback in NF or without information about the payo¤s of the other
player in PI, strategies that punish a player for deviations from the equilibrium path are impossible.
2.4 Matching, beliefs and payments
At the beginning of a session, subjects were randomly assigned a player role (row player or column
player), which they kept during the whole experiment. However, they made all their decisions
7We use the names L1; Nash and Utilitarian also in treatment PI even though a priori the subjcts cannot reason
about the other players incentives and consequently cannot identify the Nash and the Utilitarian action. However,
subjects can use their received feedback to construct a "subjective game". Kalai and Lehrer (1993) show that
subjective games can converge to an "-Nash equilibrium of the underlying game.
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from the perspective of the row player, i.e. for column players we used a transformation of the
matrix game in Table 1. Before choosing an action (choice task), we asked subjects to indicate
their beliefs regarding the behavior of their opponent (belief task). In particular, we asked subjects
to state the expected frequencies of play, i.e., they had to specify in how many out of 100 times
they expected the column player to choose Left, Center and Right in the current period.8 After the
belief task, subjects had to make their choice by selecting one of the three possible actions (mixing
was not possible). We employed belief elicitation in all four treatments to analyze the impact of
the matching scheme and information on beliefs and choices.
Subjects were paid for both tasks. For the choice task, we paid subjects according to the
numbers in the payo¤ matrix, which were exchanged at the commonly known rate of 1 point =
e 0:15. To reward the belief task, we used a quadratic scoring rule (QSR) which is incentive
compatible given that subjects are risk-neutral money maximizers. The QSR we used is dened as
follows. The payo¤QSRit for player i in period t for a given action a
k
jt with k 2 fL;C;Rg of player j
in period t and belief vector bit =
 
bLit; b
C
it ; b
R
it
 2 2 such that 2 = nbit 2 R3jPk2fL;C;Rg bkit = 1o
is YQSR
it
(bit; ajt) = A B 
X
k2fL;C;Rg

bkit   1[akjt]
2
(1)
where 1[akjt]
is an indicator function equal to 1 if akjt is chosen in period t and 0 otherwise. While
paying subjects for the choice and the belief task is necessary to ensure incentive compatibility, it
allows subjects to engage in hedging. Subjects can for example coordinate on a cell of the payo¤
matrix that is not an equilibrium and become unwilling to move away from it in order to avoid
losses in the belief task. To eliminate such behavior, we decided to determine the nal payo¤s as
follows.9 First, at the end of the experiment we selected one period randomly and independently to
determine the payo¤s for each of the two tasks. Second, we used parameters A = 1:5 and B = 0:75
in the QSR. Thus, the maximum payo¤ from the belief task (e 1:50) was relatively low compared
to payo¤s from choice task. For instance, the Nash equilibrium [Top, Left] would lead to payo¤s of
e 11:7 and e 10:2 for the two player roles.10
8For simplicity we restricted the expected frequencies of play to integers. Therefore, we count any belief statement
assigning a weight of 34 percent to one action and 33 percent to each of the remaining actions as a uniform belief
statement.
9Blanco et al (2008) propose and test a slightly di¤erent method to avoid hedging. Their hedging-proof method
suggests paying randomly either the decision task or the belief eliciatation task. They nd no evidence for hedging.
10Note that subjects could guarantee themselves a payo¤ of e 1 by stating uniform beliefs. Although this would
be an attractive choice for a risk-averse subject, we nd no evidence of such behavior in our treatments. Only 7:2
9
The experiments were conducted in the computer lab at Technical University Berlin using
the software tool kit z-Tree, developed by Fischbacher (2007). Subjects were recruited via a mailing
list through which they could voluntarily register to participate in decision experiments (Greiner,
2004). Upon entering the lab, subjects received written instructions and were asked to read them
carefully.11 After everybody had nished reading the instructions, we distributed an understanding
test that covered both the game and the QSR. Only after all subjects had answered the questions
correctly, we proceeded with the experiment. In total 206 students (115 males and 91 females) from
various disciplines participated in the four treatments. Sessions lasted about one hour. Subjects
average earnings were about e 12:80, including a show-up fee of e 3 for arriving at the laboratory
on time.
3 Results
In the rst part of the analysis, we examine the choices made by the experimental subjects. We
begin this analysis with a focus on rst period behavior and a comparison of these results to previous
experiments. Afterwards we extend our analysis to all periods and focus on the development of
behavior over time, considering the impact of the information available. In the second part of
the data analysis, we make use of the elicited beliefs. After conrming that the stated beliefs
outperform beliefs constructed with standard models of belief formation, we examine the frequency
of best responses to the stated beliefs. Furthermore we check the accuracy of the stated beliefs
in predicting the opponents choice as well as the role of feedback and payo¤ information for the
formation of beliefs.
Note that unlike in most other studies on asymmetric one-shot games (e.g. Costa-Gomes
and Weizsäcker 2008), we do not pool the data over player roles. As we study only one specic
game, we are able to consider the exact strategic situation of each player role. This di¤erentiation
would be lost by pooling the data. Thus, we run all statistical tests separately for row and column
players. All results reported as signicant in the paper are based on a 5%-level of signicance.
percent of belief statements assign no less than 30 and no more than 35 percent to all three of the opponents actions.
(RM 5:2%, FM 5:8%, PI 5:9% and NF 12:1%)
11For a sample of the instructions see the Appendix.
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Figure 1: First period choices.
3.1 Choices
3.1.1 First-period choices
In this section, we look at behavior in the rst period only. This is of some stand-alone interest,
since many experiments on behavior in one-shot 3x3 normal-form games have used similar games,
and we can compare our results to them. First-period play in our experiment di¤ers from one-
shot experiments because players know that they will play the game again. But according to the
game-theoretic prediction, this should not a¤ect play, with the exception of the xed-matching
treatment.
First-period behavior in the four treatments is presented in Figure 1. The gure shows the
fraction of each action for all four treatments. In the rst period, subjects in treatments RM, FM
and NF are in a comparable situation, and we do not observe any di¤erences in behavior, as can
be taken from Figure 1. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the frequency of choices is the same
in these three treatments using a 2-Test.12
Excluding treatment PI where players face a di¤erent game and pooling the data over
player roles, we observe 51% L1 behavior in the rst period in RM, FM and NF. This is in line
with previous studies. For instance, Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) estimated a frequency of L1 choices
of about 45%, Rey-Biel (forthcoming) found 48% L1 behavior in his constant-sum games, whereas
Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) observed slightly higher rates of about 60%.
12For both player roles we perform a pairwise comparison of RM with FM and NF, respectively. The test yields
no p-value smaller than 0:1 (2(2)).
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Figure 2: Choices in all periods.
Now consider the decision situation in the rst period of treatment PI. Subjects only know
their own payo¤s in the game and therefore cannot base their decisions on strategic considerations.
Hence, it is no surprise to see 39 out of 48 subjects (81%) choosing the L1 rule in period 1 in PI,
which not only maximizes the minimum payo¤, but also the expected payo¤ assuming that the
opponent randomizes uniformly over all possible actions. Concerning the column players choice
of the dominated action Right (Utilitarian), it is remarkable that no column player in PI chooses
the Utilitarian action in the rst period. This indicates that the choice of dominated actions in
the other treatments is due to the payo¤ structure of the other player and not to mistakes. The
frequency of the three strategies in PI is signicantly di¤erent from FM in the rst period for both
player roles (2(2); p = 0:043 for row players and p = 0:014 for column players). We summarize the
ndings on choices in the rst period in the following result.
Result 1 (i) First-period behavior in RM, FM and NF is statistically indistinguishable from each
other and comparable to ndings from one-shot experiments. (ii) Except for the row player in RM,
L1 is the most frequently chosen strategy in the rst period in all treatments and for both player
roles. (iii) In treatment PI, the fraction of subjects choosing L1 in the rst period is higher than in
all other treatments.
3.1.2 Choices over all periods
We now turn to the behavior in all 20 periods. First consider the proportion of the three actions
averaged over all rounds, displayed in Figure 2. To compare the proportion of choices over all
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Row Player Column Player
L1 L2+/Nash Utilitarian L1/L2 L3+/Nash Utilitarian
Const -0.98 -0.73 -0.09 0.41 -1.55 -0.92
(0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.17) (0.19) (0.22)
DFMPI -0.27 0.14 0.07 -0.73 0.35 0.46
(0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.24) (0.27) (0.31)
DPI 0.82 0.31 -1.05 0.67 0.55 -1.21
(0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.25) (0.27) (0.33)
DNF 0.57 -0.19 -0.35 -0.07 0.45 -0.21
(0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.25) (0.27) (0.32)
logL -976.4 -1045.1 -1042.0 -1205.2 -851.5 -844.4
2(k 1) 12.8
 4.9 13.2 12.0 11.5 13.9
N 2060
Panel-probit regression with random individual e¤ects, standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4: Choices on average (relative to RM and FM).
periods in the di¤erent treatments, we perform a regression for each strategy and player role
combination. We regress the strategies on treatment dummies. This gives us a rst indication of
the inuence of the di¤erent information conditions. To model the repeated decisions of the same
subject in each treatment, we use a panel regression with random individual e¤ects. Since subjects
had to choose one out of three possible strategies, a probit model is employed where the dependent
variable reects the inclination to choose one strategy over the other two.
The results of the regression, summarized in Table 4, reveal the relative treatment e¤ects
on the proportion of choices. The di¤erence between random and xed matching is captured by the
coe¢ cient of DFMPI :13 While the choices of row players are not a¤ected by the matching protocol
in a statistically signicant way, column players choose L1 less often with xed than with random
matching. The higher proportion of strategic choices with xed matching can be explained by the
simpler learning environment with a xed partner. Note that repeated-game e¤ects that could also
account for di¤erences between RM and FM would only a¤ect the di¤erence between the proportion
13The dummy DFMPI is coded as 1 both for treatment FM and PI. With the separate dummy for PI, DPI , we
can thereby compare FM to PI.
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Row Player Column Player
L1 L2+/Nash Utilitarian L1/L2 L3+/Nash Utilitarian
DRM  Period -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DFM  Period -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DPI  Period -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
DNF  Period -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
logL -958.7 -1030.6 -1041.4 -1192.0 -833.4 -837.8
2(k 1) 77.0
 55.8 25.6 36.2 110.9 82.8
N 2060
Panel-probit regression with individual random e¤ects, standard errors in parentheses estimated
constants for each treatment have been omitted in the table
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 5: Choices over time.
of Nash and Utilitarian play, not the proportion of L1 choices, on the equilibrium path.
Next we compare the baseline treatment RM with the no-feedback treatment NF with the
help of the dummy DNF . The lack of feedback in NF results in overall more L1 play than in RM
for the row player, which can be ascribed to the no-feedback environment being less conducive to
learning. The e¤ect of information about the other players payo¤ is captured by the coe¢ cient DPI
(for the di¤erence between FM and PI). In the partial-information treatment, there is signicantly
more L1 play and less Utilitarian play for both player roles as well as more Nash play of the column
player. The lack of information about the other players payo¤s increases non-strategic choices, and
the proportion of Utilitarian play becomes negligible as the Utilitarian outcome cannot be identied.
Next we turn to the development of behavior over time. To give a rst impression of how
subjects play the game in the di¤erent treatments, Figure 3 presents the evolution of choices for
each treatment. The gure shows averages over three periods in a given treatment for row players
in the left panel and for column players in the right panel. To investigate the potential learning
paths, we use regressions with a time trend. The results of these regressions are presented in Table
14
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5. The ndings are rather clear-cut: Non-strategic play (L1) decreases in all treatments and for
both player roles for treatment NF and except for the column player in RM and FM. Secondly,
Nash play increases in all treatments and for both player roles except for treatment NF and only
marginally for the column player in RM. Thus, in the sense of Stahl and Wilson we observe a trend
towards more strategic play (that is more Nash and less L1 play) in all treatments with feedback
information. There is no indication that subjects learn to play Nash simply by introspection and
thinking. In all treatments, the proportion of Utilitarian play hardly varies over time, the exception
being the column player in RM.
The ndings based on the various regressions can be summarized as follows.
Result 2 (i) The level of non-strategic play is lowest in FM for both player roles. (ii) The propor-
tion of non-strategic L1 play decreases in all treatments except NF. (iii) The proportion of Nash
choices increases at least marginally in all treatments and for both player roles except in NF. (iv)
The proportion of Utilitarian choices is almost constant over time for all treatments and player
roles (except for the column player in RM).
In PI, the overall lower proportion of strategic behavior compared to FM can be ascribed
to the lack of information about the opponents payo¤s. However, the fact that players in PI can
observe the choices of their opponent and react to these observations leads to a trend away from
the L1 rule, just as in RM and FM. In treatment NF, behavior does not change over time. As
the NF treatment is comparable to a repeated one-shot situation, this nding lends support to the
frequently applied method of giving no feedback between di¤erent tasks in experiments in order to
minimize learning e¤ects.
Finally, treatment FM and RM are statistically indistinguishable for the row player. But we
observe that the column players behavior is a¤ected by the matching protocol in that she chooses
more non-strategic L1 play in RM than in FM. This di¤erence can be ascribed to the fact that
the column players Utilitarian action is dominated and is thus chosen less often in the stranger
design of RM than in FM with a partner design where column players "invest" in the cooperative
outcome.
3.2 Belief formation
In this section, we focus on the relationship between the elicited beliefs and the subjectsown as
well as their opponentsactions. In standard equilibrium analysis it is assumed that subjects form
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beliefs about the behavior of the opponent and then best respond to these beliefs. The level-k
model departs from this view by positing that subjects di¤er in their strategic sophistication when
thinking about the behavior of other players, i.e., they di¤er in their beliefs (Stahl and Wilson,
1995). In particular, level-1 behavior implies that beliefs are naive in that uniform randomization
by the opponent is assumed. Level-2 types hold the belief that others best respond to uniform
randomization. Thus, we can use belief statements to measure the level of strategic sophistication
and to track the development of strategic thinking over time.
At this point, we would like to address some caveats concerning elicited beliefs. First,
subjects need not hold beliefs about the opponents play at all. For example, they might choose
some non-strategic decision rule in the rst period and then condition play on received payo¤s (as in
reinforcement learning). Forcing them to state beliefs could alter the choices if these subjects move
their decisions in the direction of belief-based play.14 However, our design is based on a comparison
between treatments which all use belief elicitation. Unless the e¤ects of belief elicitation interact
with our treatment variables, our results are immune to such problems.
Second and more importantly, the assumption of best-responses to beliefs in decision theory
can be understood as an "as if" assumption. With this interpretation, subjects do not necessarily
have to best respond to their stated beliefs as these beliefs might be unrelated to the true underlying
beliefs. In order to address this concern, we compare the stated beliefs to beliefs constructed from
previous play of the opponent in the next subsection. The stated beliefs emerge as a better predictor
of actual choices than the constructed beliefs, which lends support to the hypothesis that the elicited
beliefs are the best approximations of the true underlying beliefs that are available.15
Third, even though we asked explicitly to state myopic beliefs, i.e. beliefs only for the
current period, we cannot rule out that subjects follow repeated-game strategies and hold beliefs
consistent with this. As the choices that are part of repeated-game strategies are not necessarily
best responses to myopic beliefs, we expect best-response rates to be lower in FM than in RM if
repeated-game strategies play a role.
14See Rutström and Wilcox (2006) for an argument along these lines.
15See Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) for a thorough analysis of belief statements and their relationship to the
true beliefs.
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3.2.1 Stated beliefs vs. models of belief formation
We follow the approach used in Nyarko and Schotter (2002) and compare the explanatory power
of elicited beliefs compared to standard belief learning models. The purpose of this comparison is
to establish whether stated beliefs are a good measure of strategic uncertainty or whether stated
beliefs are inferior to beliefs derived indirectly from the opponentschoices.
Standard belief learning models assume that players update their beliefs based on the op-
ponents history of play and then best-respond to these beliefs. The two most prominent models
based on this assumption are the ctitious-play and the Cournot best-response model. While in
the Cournot model subjects best respond to the opponents play in the very last period, players in
a pure ctitious-play model best respond to beliefs based on all previous actions of the opponent.
The -weighted ctitious-play model introduced by Cheung and Friedman (1997) contains Cournot
best response and ctitious-play as special cases. In this model subject is belief bki;t+1 that subject
j will choose action akjt; k 2 fL;C;Rg in period t+ 1 is dened as:
bki;t+1 =
1[akjt]
+
Pt 1
u=1 
u1[akj;t u]
1 +
Pt 1
u=1 
u
: (2)
The parameter  is the weight the player gives to the past actions of his opponent. It is obvious
from (2) that  = 0 leads to the Cournot best-response model and  = 1 yields ctitious-play,
respectively. We incorporate this model into a standard logistic choice model to allow subjects to
best respond to their beliefs with noise. Subject i chooses action k with probability
Pr

akitjbit

=
exp
 
[akit; bit]
P
l2fL;C;Rg exp
 
[alit; bit]
 ; (3)
where [akit; bit] is the expected payo¤ of player i when she chooses an action k given her beliefs bit
over the action set of her opponent. The parameter  determines the impact of this expected payo¤
on her own choice probability and can be interpreted as a rationality parameter. A player with
 = 0 chooses all actions with equal probability disregarding the expected payo¤ of her choice. On
the other hand if !1 the player is fully rational, i.e. she always best responds to her beliefs.
With respect to the specication of individual preferences, the preceding analysis on choices
has demonstrated that information about the other players payo¤s leads to a signicant increase
in Utilitarian play. This supports the hypothesis that the payo¤s of others may matter for an
individuals utility. To avoid misspecication, we incorporate this nding in the following analysis
by allowing for other-regarding preferences
u(m; y) = m(akit; a
k
jt) + y(a
k
it; a
k
jt); (4)
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which is identical to the basic preference model of Cox et al. (2007) under the assumption of risk
neutrality. In the model,m(akit; a
k
jt) denotes the players own payo¤given the actions of both players
whereas y(akit; a
k
jt) denotes the corresponding payo¤ of the other player. Thus  is the willingness to
exchange own for others payo¤ which, in the case of risk neutrality, is equal to the marginal utility
of an additional unit of the other players payo¤ (WTP = 1=MRS = (@u=@y)=(@u=@m) = ). For
 = 0; expression (4) turns into self-interested preferences as used e.g. by Nyarko and Schotter
(2002).
We now turn to the estimation and probabilistic comparison of the choice model (3) based
on the -weighted ctitious-play model (2) on the one hand, and based on the stated beliefs on the
other hand. The model assumes that subjects process information about their own and the others
payo¤s as well as about the history of the others play. Because of the latter, we have to exclude
treatment NF in the estimation. Besides the FM data, we use the data from treatment RM, since
the process described in (2) can also be interpreted as the formation of beliefs over the average play
of the population rather than over individual choices. Furthermore we can run the regression using
the data from treatment PI with  being restricted to 0. The estimation results for each treatment
and player role are presented in Table 6.16
ML-estimation of model (3) using Model selection
Fictitious beliefs (2) Stated beliefs Vuong (1989)
Treatm Role    logL   logL Z p-value
RM Row 0.017* 0.337 0.575*** -575.5 0.090*** 0.060 -488.9 -6.5 0.000
Col 0.072*** -0.105 0.905*** -462.0 0.066*** -0.067 -425.0 -2.6 0.010
FM Row 0.052*** 0.132 0.682*** -480.7 0.104*** 0.212*** -390.0 -4.9 0.000
Col 0.031*** 0.684 0.670*** -478.6 0.076*** 0.615*** -375.9 -6.3 0.000
PI Row 0.044*** - 0.649*** -487.7 0.065*** - -451.2 -3.7 0.000
Col 0.057*** - 0.622*** -413.6 0.107*** - -308.0 -5.8 0.000
p-values are two-sided. Clarkes (2007) test gives the same results and yields very similar p-values.
Table 6: Comparison of citious and stated beliefs.
As a rst result we observe that the belief models play a signicant role in explaining the
behavior of our subjects. This is especially for the model using the stated beliefs, since here the
16For the -weighted ctitious-play model we estimated  and  simultaneously. The ML-estimations and tests
have been conducted with Stata and Matlab.
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hypothesis that the rationality parameter  is equal to zero is rejected for all treatments and player
roles. Using tests for the selection between non-nested models introduced by Vuong (1989) and
Clarke (2003), the hypothesis of equal explanatory power of the models can be rejected at all usual
signicance levels for all treatments and player roles, whereas the stated belief model is always
closer to the real data generating process than the belief-learning model.17
To summarize, we extend the nding of Nyarko and Schotter (2002) from a matching-
pennies game to our normal-form game with a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. Furthermore, we allow for other-regarding preferences and nd evidence for them. The
estimations show that stated beliefs are better at explaining observed choices than beliefs that are
implied by the standard models of belief formation. In the following, we therefore use the stated
beliefs when analyzing the impact of experience and information on the consistency and accuracy
of beliefs.
3.2.2 Consistency of actions and stated beliefs
Both in standard Nash equilibrium and in the level-k model it is assumed that subjects best respond
to their beliefs. Using the elicited beliefs, we can investigate the consistency of actions and stated
beliefs, i.e. whether subjects best respond to their stated beliefs. This helps us to evaluate the
relative descriptive validity of assuming best-response behavior in the four di¤erent treatments.
However, in treatment FM the possibility of repeated-game strategies implies that subjects do not
necessarily choose a best response to their myopic belief. For example, if column players in FM
expect the row player to choose the Utilitarian action and respond by choosing it as well for the
sake of keeping up cooperation in later periods, this choice does not represent a best response.
Thus, best-response rates will be lower in FM than in RM if repeated-game e¤ects play a role.
In Figure 4 the proportion of players best responding to their stated beliefs is displayed
for each player role and treatment separately. The gure shows the average proportion of best
responses over three periods. In all treatments, the average best-response rates are rather low,
ranging mainly from 45% to 75%. In order to compare our results to other studies, it is useful to
17Vuongs test statistic is based on the overall likelihood ratio of two rival models and is asymptotically normally
distributed under the null. Clarkes test statistic consists of the number of single likelihood ratios being greater than
1 which is binomially distributed under the null with parameters  = 0:5 and the number of observations in each
subset of the data. Vuongs test is outperformed by Clarkes test when the distribution of the single log-likelihood
ratios is highly peaked. Both tests were calculated using corrections for the dimension of the models as proposed by
Schwarz (1978) and Clarke (2007) respectively.
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Figure 4: Best-response rates over time.
look at the aggregated best-response behavior of all subjects. Averaging over all treatments and
player roles, subjects best-respond to their stated beliefs in 63% of the cases (in RM in 63% of the
cases). This is in line with best-response rates found in similar studies. In simple games like 2x2
games (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002) or constant-sum games (Rey-Biel, forthcoming), consistency
rates are about 70%, whereas the rates range from 49% to 63% in more complicated games like ours
or the games used in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) and Ehrblatt et al.(2008), respectively.
For statistical evidence on di¤erences between the treatments and the development of best-
response rates over time, we run random-e¤ects panel regressions. As the dependent variable is
either 0 (no best response) or 1 (best response), we use a probit model. Besides the constant, the
independent variables are dummies for FM/PI, PI and NF. In addition, we test for a linear time
trend in each treatment. The regression results are summarized in Table 7 and 8.
Di¤erences in the level of best-response rates between treatments are not very large, as
displayed in Table 7. They only exception is the column player in PI who best responds more often
than in FM simply because he rarely chooses the Utilitarian action that he cannot identify as such.
This nding of no strong di¤erences in best-response rates between treatments is in line with
the theory according to which best-response behavior is independent of the information players have.
However, when considering whether subjects learn to best respond in the baseline treatment RM
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Best Response Rates
Row Player Column Player
Const 0.30 0.56
(0.15) (0.19)
DFMPI 0.25 -0.39
(0.21) (0.26)
DPI -0.36 0.85
(0.22) (0.27)
DNF -0.26 0.12
(0.21) (0.27)
logL -1237.8 -1058.1
2(k 1) 6.2 10.2

N 2060
Panel-probit regression with random individual
e¤ects.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 7: Best-response rates.
in the course of the experiment, the signicant and positive coe¢ cient of Period in Table 8 reveals
that this is the case for the column player and also marginally for the row player. Similarly, in
FM best-response rates increase signicantly for the row player, and marginally signicantly for
the column player. The two other treatments, PI and NF, do not display signicant increases in
best-response rates.
This raises two questions. First, why do best-response rates increase at all? Second, why do
best-response rates increase in treatments RM and FM, but not in PI and NF? Internal consistency
requires best responding to ones beliefs, independent of the information conditions and a players
experience with a game. The results from treatments RM and FM suggest that learning to play a
game seems to encompass learning to be internally consistent. In treatment NF, however, subjects
might be doubtful about the accuracy of their beliefs, lacking information about the other players
behavior. This might induce them to put less weight on their beliefs when choosing an action. But
this reasoning fails to explain the similar result in treatment PI where there is also no discernible
increase in best-response behavior. In PI, players have to learn about the structure of the game over
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Best Response Rates
Row Player Column Player
DRM  Period 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
DFM  Period 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
DPI  Period -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
DNF  Period 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
logL -1229.2 -1052.6
2(k 1) 32.3
 50.1
N 2060
Panel-probit regression with random individual
e¤ects, estimated constants for each treatment
have been omitted in the table
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 8: Best-response rates over time.
time. Thus, the complexity of learning the structure of the game and learning to best respond to
ones beliefs at the same time may be too high. Second, in treatment PI many subjects start with
uniform beliefs and best respond to them. As the belief set of L1 is large and L1 is an attractive
strategy initially, there is a high rate of consistency at the outset. This e¤ect is absent in RM, FM
and NF.
The focus of the preceding analysis was on myopic beliefs. In the repeated-game setting of
treatment FM, folk theorem results are possible. If subjects aim at a cooperative outcome, column
players might choose their dominated action (Utilitarian) when expecting Utilitarian play of row
players. This explains why we observe lower best-response rates and more Utilitarian choices
for column players in FM compared to NF and PI. But we observe a substantial proportion of
Utilitarian play also in RM in both player roles. Moreover, the regressions reveal no signicant
di¤erences between FM and RM neither for the overall proportion of Utilitarian play (see Table 4),
nor for the average best response rates (see Table 7). This suggests that it is mainly the subjects
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preference for maximizing the overall payo¤ that leads to the high level of Utilitarian actions of the
row player in FM, RM and NF, not repeated-game e¤ects.
The insignicant di¤erence of best-response rates in FM and RM could be due to a higher
number of failures to best respond to undominated actions in RM, which would push best-response
rates down in the direction of FM. But this is not the case. When considering only the best-response
behavior to Nash and L1, we nd best response rates of about 92% in FM and 88% in RM. We can
further support this nding of equal best-response rates in FM and RM by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test which compares the number of best responses to Nash and L1 of each subject. The test yields
a p-value of p > 0:88.18 For these reasons we consider the evidence for repeated-game strategies as
weak.
Result 3 (i) The overall level of best responses does not di¤er signicantly between treatments RM
and FM as well as RM and NF. Only column players in PI best-respond signicantly more often
than in FM. (ii) While the proportion of best responses increases over time in RM and FM, there
is no signicant time trend in NF and PI.
Interpreting the stated beliefs as proxies for the true underlying beliefs, we can conclude
that actors learn to best respond more often to their beliefs in games with feedback information
and information about the game structure with some experience of the situation, compared to
situations with less information and experience. Thus, actors become more sophisticated over time
in that the consistency of their actions and beliefs increases. This is a novel observation, and we are
not aware of any model of rational or boundedly rational choice which can account for this nding.
3.2.3 Accuracy of stated beliefs
We will now focus on whether the elicited beliefs are accurate in predicting the behavior of the
opponents. As the accuracy of beliefs is a measure of strategic sophistication, it di¤ers under the
Nash equilibrium prediction and under the level-k model. In the Nash equilibrium of the stage game,
subjects hold accurate beliefs about their opponents choice. In the level-k model, however, this
is not necessarily the case as subjectsbeliefs can be at odds with their opponentsbehavior. The
experimental data from the di¤erent treatments allow us to identify the factors enabling subjects
18We use each column player as an independent observation and compare the empirical distribution of the number
of best responses to Nash and L1 between FM and RM.
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Figure 5: Accuracy of stated beliefs.
to predict their opponents play and to state accurate beliefs. In order to measure how well stated
beliefs predict the opponents play, we use the earnings from the quadratic scoring rule (QSR).
Figure 5 shows the earnings (averaged over three periods) from the QSR for all treatments
and for both player roles.19 The average payo¤ across treatments and player roles is about e 1.20
This corresponds to the payo¤ for a subject who states uniform beliefs, which is indicated by the
vertical line in Figure 5. The second benchmark to which we can compare the earnings is e 0:50;
representing the expected payo¤ from randomizing uniformly over degenerate beliefs.
Although subjects earned hardly more than e 1; their beliefs were more accurate than
if they simply tried to predict the choice of their opponent with a probability of one (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, all p-values < 0:01). For row players in all four treatments, we cannot reject the
hypothesis of equal means at a 5% level of signicance for all treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p-values > 0:085). The same holds for column players in FM and PI, but column players in
NF and RM earned on average signicantly less than e 1 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, for NF and
19 In principle, the accuracy of predicting others behavior should not depend on the player role. Indeed, we only nd
a weakly signicant di¤erence between player roles in RM (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:051). In all other treatments
the same test yields p-values higher than 0:49.
20The average payo¤ across player roles is e 0.92 in RM, e 1.07 in FM, e 1.02 in PI and e 0.89 in NF.
25
Belief Accuracy
Row Player Column Player
Const 0.96 0.88
(0.04) (0.04)
DFMPI 0.09 0.20
(0.06) (0.06)
DPI -0.02 -0.07
(0.06) (0.06)
DNF -0.05 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06)
logL -1403.8 -1386.4
2(k 1) 7.4
 18.7
N 2060
Panel-probit regression with random individual
e¤ects.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 9: Accuracy of stated beliefs.
RM p-values < 0:01):
Our main interest again lies in the development over time. If players become more strategic
in the course of the experiment and reason more about the incentives of the opponent, the accuracy
of beliefs should increase. Notice that this interpretation encompasses cases where play converges
to a combination of choices, and players therefore hold correct beliefs. Figure 5 displays such
improvements over time in predicting the opponents play in all treatments except for NF. For
the statistical analysis, we ran a random-e¤ects panel regression where the dependent variable is
the payo¤ from the belief elicitation task. The results are displayed in Table 9. In addition to
the constant, the regression includes treatment dummies for the controls FM/PI, PI and NF as
independent variables. The only signicant di¤erence concerns the column player who exhibits a
lower accuracy of beliefs in RM than in FM. Again, this can be explained by the higher predictability
of a xed partner.
In addition, we performed tests of the time trends in all treatments reported in Table 10.
Here, we observe a clear pattern. The column players improve their predictions in all treatments
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Belief Accuracy
Row Player Column Player
DRM  Period 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00)
DFM  Period 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00)
DPI  Period 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00)
DNF  Period -0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
logL -1398.9 -1366.8
2(k 1) 1642.2
 1621.6
N 2060
Panel-probit regression with random individual
e¤ects, estimated constants for each treatment
have been omitted in the table.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 10: Accuracy of stated beliefs over time.
except in NF. For the row players there is no signicant time trend. The ndings can be summarized
as follows:
Result 4 (i) Overall, there is no signicant di¤erence between the accuracy of beliefs in the four
treatments when comparing RM with FM and with NF, as well as FM with PI. Only column players
in FM submit more accurate beliefs than in RM. (ii) In treatments RM, FM and PI, behavior is
characterized by a similar learning path in that the column players beliefs are more accurate in
later periods, while there is no time trend for the row player.
The results indicate that feedback about past behavior of ones opponent(s) is more im-
portant for learning to predict choices than information about the full game. In addition, playing
with the same opponent facilitates accurate predictions of choices. Thus, feedback information and
xed matching allow players to form accurate beliefs which are an important ingredient of Nash
equilibrium play.
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4 Summary and Conclusions
We performed an experiment to study the development of strategic reasoning over a limited number
of periods. To classify the strategies of the 3x3 normal-form game employed in our study, we used
the level-k model of Stahl and Wilson (1995) and allowed both for selsh and other-regarding
preferences. This classication of choices allowed us to track strategic play over time. In order to
understand the determinants of strategic play, we varied the information available to the players
and elicited their beliefs about opponentsplay.
We nd that feedback information and information about the payo¤s of the opponent have
an impact on choices. When either type of information is lacking, this leads to an increase in non-
strategic (L1) play. The absence of information about the opponents payo¤s additionally leads to
a decrease in Utilitarian play. However, not revealing the opponents payo¤ function has almost no
impact on the learning path. In all treatments except for NF, subjects exhibit less non-strategic
and more Nash play over time. In contrast, in the no-feedback treatment there is no increase
in strategic play in the course of the experiment. This fact clearly highlights the importance of
feedback and the limits of deductive reasoning of the subjects.
Regarding the analysis of beliefs, we rst evaluate whether stated beliefs or beliefs con-
structed with belief-learning models are a better proxy for the underlying true beliefs of the subjects.
We nd that the stated beliefs are more consistent with actual choices than beliefs constructed with
belief models such as weighted ctitious play or Cournot best response. Given this result, we study
the best-response rates to the stated beliefs. In treatments RM and FM, actions are consistent with
stated beliefs more frequently in later periods. Incomplete information about the opponents payo¤
function in PI or no feedback in treatment NF inhibit this trend towards more best responses in
later periods.
The accuracy of the subjectsbeliefs with respect to the opponents choices is increasing over
time in all treatments except in NF. Remarkably, removing the information about the opponents
payo¤ function does not signicantly decrease the overall accuracy of beliefs nor its development
over time. However, without feedback information players are not able to improve their predictions
of the other players behavior in the course of the experiment.
Summing up, the higher proportion of non-strategic choices in terms of the level-k model
and the lower accuracy of beliefs in early compared to later rounds in treatments PI, FM and also in
RM show that subjects learn to play the game in environments with feedback, but independent of
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the information on the payo¤s of the other player and the matching protocol. This validates the use
of inductive learning models. Moreover, we nd an increase in the internal consistency of choices
and beliefs in the course of the experiment, but only in the treatments with full information about
the game and feedback. This nding is by now very little understood and in our view deserves
more thorough empirical scrutiny.
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Appendix
Instructions (for FM)
The experiment you are about to participate in is part of a project nanced by the German
Research Foundation (DFG). Its aim is to analyze economic decision-making behavior. You can
earn a considerable amount of money in this experiment, dependent on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. Consequently, it is extremely important that you read these
instructions very carefully.
Please note: these instructions are for your eyes only, and it is not permitted to hand on any
information whatsoever to other participants. Similarly, you are not allowed to speak to the other
participants throughout the whole experiment. Should you have a question, please raise your hand
and we will come to you and answer your question individually. Please do not ask your question(s)
aloud. If you break these rules, we will unfortunately be compelled to discontinue the experiment.
General information The experiment is made up of several periods where decisions must be
made and questions answered. You can win points with your decisions. These points represent
your earnings and will be converted into euros at the end of the game and paid out in cash. The
exact procedure of the experiment, the various decisions and the method of payment are clearly
explained in the next section.
The decision-making situation At the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned by
draw to another participant, randomly and anonymously. This allocation is maintained throughout
the whole of the remaining experiment. The participant who has been assigned to you will be called
the other onefrom now on.
In each period, you and the other one will be confronted with the same decision-making
situation. Each time, you must choose between the three alternatives: top, middle, and
bottom.
Each of these three alternatives has been given three possible payo¤s (as points). The other
one must also decide between three alternatives (left, center or right), and each of these
alternatives has also three possible payo¤s, as above. You will see the following input screen on the
computer:
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Your three alternatives, top, middle, and bottom, are listed in the rst column of the
table. Next to your alternatives, you can see three boxes, each with two numbers. The subscript
(lower) number is always your possible payo¤. On the input screen illustrated above, the alternative
tophas been allocated the payo¤ of 78, 72 and 12, the alternative middlethe payo¤ of 67, 59
and 78, and the alternative bottom the payo¤ of 21, 62 and 89. This means that should you
decide on top, for example, then your payo¤ is 78, 72 or 12 points. The payo¤ you actually
receive depends on whether the other one selects left, center or right. Thus your payo¤
depends on your own decision as well as that of the other one. The superscript (raised) number
in any box is always the possible payo¤ of the other one. For example, if the other one decides on
left, then his/her possible payo¤ points are 68, 52 and 11. This means, for example, that if you
decide on middleand the other one decides on right, your payo¤ is 78 points. The payo¤ for
the other one is 49 points in this case.
The possible payo¤ points on the input screen above are therefore as follows:
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You choose top; the other one chooses left:
Your payo¤ is: 78 points
The payo¤ for the other one is: 68 points
You choose top; the other one chooses center
Your payo¤ is: 72 points
The payo¤ for the other one is: 23 points
You choose top; the other one chooses right:
Your payo¤ is: 12 points
The payo¤ for the other one is: 20 points
You choose middle; the other one chooses left:
Your payo¤ is: 67 points
The payo¤ for the other one is: 52 points
You choose middle; the other one chooses center:
Your payo¤ is: 59 points
The payo¤ for the other one is: 63 points
You choose middle; the other one chooses right:
Your payo¤ is: 78 points
The payo¤ for the other one is: 49 points
You choose bottom; the other one chooses left:
Your payo¤ is: 21 points
The payo¤ for the other one is: 11 points
You choose bottom; the other one chooses center:
Your payo¤ is: 62 points
The payo¤ for the other one is: 89 points
You choose bottom; the other one chooses right:
Your payo¤ is: 89 points
The payo¤ for the other one is: 78 points
Please note that the possible payo¤ points for you and the other one remain the same in
every period.
The other one always has exactly the same input screen in front of him/her as you do. After
you and the other one have chosen between the three alternatives, you will be informed of your
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payo¤ in this period. This is the only information you will be given during the experiment in each
period. The next period begins after that.
Statement of expectations
a) How can you state your expectations? Before each decision-making situation, you
will be asked how you estimate the decision-making behavior of the other one. This means that at
the beginning of each period we will require you to predict how the other one will decide in this
period. You will have to answer the following question:
In how many out of 100 cases do you expect the other one to decide on left, centeror right?
Of course, the other one makes his decision only once in each period. You could also consider
the question as asking you to state the likelihood that each of the three alternatives is chosen by
the other one. You will see the following input screen on the computer:
35
Your three alternatives, top, middle and bottom, are listed in the table above, as
well as the corresponding possible payo¤. Below that, there is the question with the three boxes.
Let us assume that you are sure that the other one will choose right, and denitely not
center or left. Then you would respond to our question by entering the number 100 in the
box for right and the number 0 in the boxes for center and left. Alternatively, we could
assume that you think the other one will probably choose center, but there is still a small chance
that s/he will choose right, and an even smaller chance that s/he will choose left. Then, for
example, you might respond to our question by entering the number 70 for center, 20 for right
and 10 for left.
If you think it is even more unlikely that s/he will choose center, then you could enter,
for example, 60 for center, 24 for rightand 16 for left. Or it is possible that you think it is
equally likely that the other one will choose left, centerand right. Then you should enter,
for example, the numbers 33, 33, 34 in the boxes.
Please note that the three numbers may not be decimal, and that they must always add up
to 100.
N.B.: The numbers used in the examples have been chosen arbitrarily. They
give you no indication how you and the other one decide.
b) How is the payo¤ for your stated expectations calculated? Your payo¤ is
calculated after you have guessed how frequently the other one chooses his/her three alternatives.
Your payo¤ depends on the di¤erence between your estimate of the frequency of the decision and
the actual decision made. Your payo¤ is higher when you have guessed that the other one often
makes the truedecision (which s/he really made), and it is lower when you have guessed that
the other one will make this decision infrequently. Similarly, your payo¤ is higher when you have
correctly predicted that the other one will not make a particular decision and then s/he in fact
does not make the decision.
The exact calculation of the payo¤ is as follows: We calculate a number for each of the
three alternatives. This number reects how appropriate your estimate of the decision frequency
of the corresponding alternative was. We take these three numbers to calculate your payo¤.
First, we consider how well you predicted the alternatives which were actually chosen. Let
us assume that the other one chose left. We then compare your estimate of how often the other
one would choose leftout of 100 cases with the number 100, and calculate the di¤erence between
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the two. This di¤erence is then multiplied by itself and the resulting number multiplied by the
factor 0.0005. Thus, if you expected the other one to choose leftin many out of 100 cases, then
this number will be smaller (since the di¤erence between your estimate and 100 is small) than if
you expected that s/he would choose leftin few out of 100 cases.
Then we consider how well you predicted that the other two alternatives would not be
chosen. Let us assume again, for example, that the other one chose left, which at the same time
means that centerand rightwere not chosen. Then we take your estimate for the alternative
centerand multiply this by itself. The resulting number is again multiplied by the factor 0.0005.
We apply this procedure again to your estimate for the alternative right. We then take the three
numbers thus calculated and deduct them from the number 10. This determines the number of
points you receive for your statement of expectations.
As an illustration of how your payo¤ might appear, let us consider three examples. Let us
assume that the other one chose leftand that your estimate for leftwas 100 and correspondingly
0 for the other two alternatives. This means that you have stated an estimate that is exactly right.
Consequently, you earn the following points:
10  0:0005  (100  100)2   0:0005  02   0:0005  02 = 10
Let us assume again that the other one chose left. Your estimate for leftwas 60, for
center 20 and for right 20, which means that your stated estimate predicted that the other
one would choose leftmore frequently than center and right. Consequently, you earn the
following points:
10  0:0005  (100  60)2   0:0005  202   0:0005  202 = 8:8
If we still assume that the other one chose left, but your estimate for leftwas 0, for
center also 0 and for right 100, this means that your stated estimate was exactly wrong.
Consequently, you earn the following points:
10  0:0005  (100  0)2   0:0005  02   0:0005  1002 = 0
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N.B.: The numbers used in the examples have been chosen arbitrarily. They
give no indication how you and the other one decide.
These examples should make it clear that you will always receive a payo¤ of at least 0
points, and at most 10 points for your stated expectations. And the closer your estimations, the
more money you earn. (You may be asking yourself why we have chosen such a payo¤ ruling as
described above. The reason being that with such a payo¤ ruling, you can expect the highest
payment when you state numbers that are closest to your own estimate.)
Procedure and payment The experiment consists of 20 periods altogether. In each period, you
have to rst state your estimate of the behavior of the other one, and then make your own decision.
At the end of the experiment, a period each for the decision-making situation and for the
statement of expectations will be chosen randomly in order to determine your earnings in the
experiment. The choice of both periods will be made randomly by the experiment leader throwing
a dice. The chosen periods will then be entered onto the input screen by the experiment leader.
At the end of the experiment, you will see an overview of your earnings from the decision-making
situation and your earnings from the statement of expectation, as well as the total amount. The
payo¤ that you have attained in the corresponding period chosen will be converted at a rate of
1 point = 15 cents
and will be paid out in cash.
Do you have any questions?
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Control questions Now you have to answer 7 questions. In this way we are checking whether
you have understood the decisions you have to make during the experiment. Should you have any
further questions, please raise your hand and one of the experiment leaders will come to you. The
experiment will not start until all participants have answered the control questions correctly.
The decision-making situation:
1. If you choose bottomand the other one chooses center, how many points do you earn?
________
2. If you choose middleand the other one chooses left, how many points does the other one
earn?
________
3. If we assume your payo¤ amounts to 12, which decision did the other one make?
________
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4. If you choose bottom and the other one chooses left, how much do you earn and how
much does the other one earn?
The other one:___________ You:__________
5. Consider the following two cases:
You expect the other one to choose leftin 80 out of 100 cases. The other one actually does
choose left. You expect the other one to choose leftin 20 out of 100 cases. The other one
actually chooses right. In both cases we assume that you expect the other one to choose
centerin 0 out of 100 cases.
Is your payo¤ for the statement of expectation in the rst case:
higher the same lower (Please underline your answer!)
than in the second case?
6. Imagine that Participant 1 states the following expectation: The other one chooses left
in 50 out of 100 cases, center in 20 out of 100 cases, and right in 30 out of 100 cases.
Participant 2 expects the following: the other one chooses left in 60 out of 100 cases,
center in 20 out of 100 cases, and right in 20 out of 100 cases. We will assume that
the other one chose leftby Participant 1 as well as by Participant 2. Who will receive the
highest payo¤?
Participant _____
7. If you consider all three alternatives to be equally possible, which numbers should you then
enter?
left:________ center:_________ right:_________
Thank you for participating in the experiment!
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